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Abstract
The prototype of a cyclic dominant system is the so-called rock-scissors-paper game, but similar relation
among competing strategies can be identified in several other models of evolutionary game theory. In this
work we assume that a specific strategy from the available set is reluctant to adopt alternative states,
hence the related learning activity is reduced no matter which other strategy is considered for adoption.
Paradoxically, this modification of the basic model will primarily elevate the stationary fraction of another
strategy who is the virtual predator of the one with reduced learning activity. This general reaction of
the studied systems is in agreement with our understanding about Lotka-Volterra type cyclic dominant
systems where lowering the invasion rate between a source and target species promotes the growth of former
population. The observed effect is highly non-linear because the effective invasion rates between strategies
may depend sensitively on the details of the actual model.
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1. Introduction
Cyclic dominant relation among competing
species is a well-known and frequently quoted mech-
anism when we want to understand the diver-
sity of species in a living system which evolves
under the rule of Darwinian selection principle
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In the simplest and highly
simplified case a species A dominates species B,
but he latter outperforms species C. More interest-
ingly, species C invades species A, which establishes
a fine balance among all participants. This relation
is in the heart of the celebrated rock-scissors-paper
(RSP ) game, which was identified in many biolog-
ical and social systems, ranging from interaction
between bacterias [9, 10, 11], plants [12], animals
[13, 14, 15], and even humans [16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 19].
A seemingly surprisingly consequence of the non-
transitive dynamics is when the invasion rates be-
tween species are unequal. Here a lowered invasion
rate by one species results in a decreased station-
ary fraction of the species that invades it. As a
consequence, due to odd number of species in the
loop, by lowering the invasion rate of a species will
increase its fraction in the population [22, 23].
Before we proceed, we should note that the men-
tioned non-transitive relation between competing
partners may emerge in other types of evolutionary
game models, too [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
For instance, by introducing voluntary participa-
tion into the classic public goods game we can ob-
serve an RSP -type cycle among cooperators, defec-
tors, and loners [33]. But similar phenomenon can
also be identified in the simplest prisoner’s dilemma
game [34]. There are other examples of more com-
plex models as well where the relation of strate-
gies is less obvious, but the collective behavior of
spatial setting results in similar propagating fronts
patterns we have already observed for RSP game.
Beside the obvious parallel to the latter, however,
there is a significant difference in the lastly men-
tioned evolutionary game models. In particular,
staying at the simplest prisoner’s dilemma extended
by loner strategy, a cooperator agent may adopt not
just defector, but also loner strategy during an el-
ementary step. In this way there is no a one-way
flow of invasion among strategies that we experi-
enced for RSP -game.
In the following we explore the possible conse-
quence of modified invasion rates in these models
where there is bidirectional adoption between com-
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peting strategies. Technically it can be done in the
simplest way if we introduce a strategy-dependent
learning activity. More precisely, we assume that
a player who posses one of the strategies are reluc-
tant to change their states and the usual payoff-
difference driven adoption probability is multiplied
by a constant factor to them. Our primary interest
is to check how this intervention into the dynamical
rule changes the stationary fractions of strategies.
In the next section we define the general scheme
that is applied to specific models. After we study
in detail the consequences for three previously sug-
gested models where non-transitive relations were
identified. Last we conclude with the summary of
the results and a discussion of their implications.
2. Strategy-dependent learning activity in
cyclically dominant systems
According to the general setup, we have at least
three competing strategies who invade each other
in a cyclic manner. This non-transitive relation be-
tween S1, S2, and S3 strategies is marked by a blue
arrow in Fig. 1. According to the broadly accepted
dynamical rule a player y having strategy sy adopts
the strategy of a neighboring player x who has sx
strategy with a probability driven by the payoff dif-
ference of the mentioned players:
Γ(sx → sy) = [1 + exp(Πsy −Πsx)/K]
−1 . (1)
Here Πsx and Πsy are the payoff values of related
players who collected it by playing the actual game
with their neighbors. FurthermoreK noise parame-
ter quantifies a certain level of uncertainty in strat-
egy adoptions in a way that it is likely to adopt the
strategy of a player who has higher payoff value,
but the reversed process may also happen with a
low probability.
As we have already stressed in the introduction,
strategy invasion may happen in both directions be-
tween competing strategies that is a fundamental
difference from the classic RSP game. Further-
more, we assume that players, having a specific
strategy, are reluctant to change their state. In
the mentioned plot S3 denotes this specific strategy.
Accordingly, a player having S3 strategy adopts an
alternative strategy with a probability wl ·Γ, where
Γ is the payoff difference driven adoption rate while
0 < wl ≤ 1 represents the learning activity of play-
ers following strategy S3. This intervention into
the microscopic rule is marked by dashed arrows in
Fig. 1.
For easier reference in the relation of S2 and S3
we will call S2 as a “predator” and S3 as a “prey”
strategy because in most of the cases S2 invades S3.
But we highlight that the direction of this invasion
is not exclusive. Furthermore we note that the re-
duced learning activity players with S3 strategy is
also valid between S1 and S3 strategy invasion that
is marked by dashes arrows in the mentioned plot.
S
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Figure 1: General scheme of the model modification. In
the basic model three strategies compete where there is an
effective cyclic dominance between them, as signed by a blue
arrow. In particular S1 invades S2, who invades S3, while
the latter invades S1. In the modified model S3 will adopt an
external strategy with a reduced probability. This is marked
by dashed arrows in the plot.
In the following we revisit three previously stud-
ied models where an effective cyclic dominance was
revealed among the strategies who evolve accord-
ing to an evolutionary game theory rule. In every
case we briefly summarize the relation of compet-
ing strategies and explore the possible consequence
of modified dynamical rule on the stationary frac-
tions of competitors. Notably, the game is played
on a square grid, but the results remain intact if we
apply alternative interaction graphs. For proper
comparison with previous results we apply K = 0.1
value for all discussed cases, but naturally our ob-
servations are not restricted to this noise level. Fur-
ther details of Monte Carlo simulations including
system sizes, relaxation and measuring time will be
specifically provided to each case.
2.1. Case study 1: Prisoner’s dilemma with loners
We first consider the traditional prisoner’s
dilemma game where beside cooperator (C) and
defector (D) strategies loners (L) are also involved
[34]. The payoff of the mentioned strategies is
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Figure 2: Improvement of “predator” strategy in dependence of loner’s payoff at T = 1.1 in prisoner’s dilemma game where
cooperators and defectors compete with loners. The applied wl learning activities for a specified strategy are marked in the
figure legends. For example in panel (a) cooperators are forced to adopt external strategies with lower probabilities. As a
response, the fraction of defectors increases as we decrease the value of wl. The upper plot marks the ranks of strategies,
where defectors beat cooperators who beat loners, etc. We note that the improvement of predator strategy is only valid if the
three-strategy state is maintained. At small σ in panel (b) or at large σ in panel (c) the system leaves the cyclically dominant
solution.
D C L
D 0 T σ
C 0 1 σ
L σ σ σ
In this model beside the temptation to defect (T )
the key parameter is σ that determines a loner’s and
its partner’s payoff. According to previous obser-
vations the presence of risk averse loners introduce
a cyclic dominance among competitors which help
the system to avoid the expected tragedy of the
commons state. More precisely, while defectors do
better than cooperators, but they are unable to ex-
ploit loners. On the other hand, cooperators can
help each other better than loners, which estab-
lishes the mentioned non-transitive relation.
When we apply a reduced learning activity to
players who carry a specific strategy then the sta-
tionary faction of competing strategies change. In
Figure 2 we have summarized the most important
effects where each panel shows the consequence
when a certain strategy is “protected” by a lowered
invasion rate. For example in panel (a) coopera-
tors are reluctant to change, still the most rewarded
players are defectors, who are the “predators” of C
strategy in the cyclic loop. The figure shows the
stationary fraction in dependence of loner’s payoff
for different strategy learning activity as indicated
in the legend, where the largest change can be ob-
served for small wl values. Notably, neither fC nor
fL growth in response to lower wl values of cooper-
ators. Actually, the opposite is true, the fractions
of the mentioned strategies decrease due to the con-
servation law of total strategy number.
Similar behavior can be seen in panel (b) where
defectors are reluctant to change, but loners enjoy
this intervention into the model dynamics. Here,
at low σ values we can see that the described in-
crement of fL is not valid anymore, but this is be-
cause the system leaves the three-strategy state at
this parameter value. Consequently the argument,
which is based on the cyclic loop of ranks, cannot
be applied anymore. In the last panel loners adopts
external strategy with a lowered probability that el-
evates the general cooperation level. But this effect
vanishes at large σ values when the cyclically dom-
inant solution is not valid anymore.
For the requested accuracy of data we have used
L× L = 800× 800 system size where 4 · 105 Monte
Carlo steps (MCS) were applied to reach the sta-
tionary state at a given parameter value and we av-
eraged stationary data over another 6 · 105 MCSs.
In Fig. 3 we have plotted the mentioned “preda-
tor” strategy fractions for the three different cases
as a function of wl value. All curves indicate clearly
that the portion of “predator” strategy increases
continuously by lowering the wl of “prey” strategy.
This observation is valid until the three-strategy so-
lution remains stable. The latter is not fulfilled at
low wl values for fD curve where loners die out and
cooperators and defectors coexist. Notably the ap-
plied T = 1.1 value would be too high for their
coexistence in the traditional model, but the low-
ered wl value shifts the balance for the benefit of
cooperator strategy.
Summing up, in the simplest evolutionary game
theory model where the applied payoff values indi-
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Figure 3: Stationary fraction of “predator” strategies in de-
pendence of the learning activity of their related “prey”
strategies. It is a general phenomenon that a lower wl of
“prey” strategy results in a higher stationary fraction of
its “predator” strategy if the system remains in the three-
strategy cyclically dominant solution. If it is not fulfilled
then a two-strategy solution is still possible, as it is illus-
trated for fD curve at small wl values. The cost of loners
is σ = 0.7 for fC , 0.8 for fL, and 0.85 for fD curve while
T = 1.1 for all cases.
cate a cyclic loop among competing strategies the
introduction of reduced strategy learning activity
results in a similar system reaction we previously
observed for the traditional RSP model where in-
vasion was only possible in a directed way.
2.2. Case study 2: Conditional cooperators and de-
fectors with deceitful defectors
In our next example we stay at prisoner’s
dilemma game but introduce more sophisticated
strategies [35]. Here, beside pure defectors (D) we
have conditional cooperators (C) who successfully
detect defection with probability p and avoid being
exploited. As a tactical response, we allow some
defectors to hide their proper face and deceive co-
operator players. They are called deceitful defec-
tors (X) who can still exploit cooperator mates. Of
course there is no free lunch, hence deceitful strat-
egy should bear an extra cost of successful hide.
The applied payoff matrix is the following:
D C X
D 0 0 0
C 0/S 1 S
X −γ (T − γ) −γ
where γ denotes the mentioned extra cost for
strategy X , while T (temptation to defect) and
S (sucker’s payoff) are the usual free parameters
of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game. For
the proper comparison with previous results, but
without loosing generality, we apply T = 1.3 and
S = −0.3 in the following. Importantly, a coopera-
tor successfully recognizes pure defectors with prob-
ability p, hence in this case the zero value is used in
the second row, first column when a C player meets
with a D player. With probability 1 − p, however,
a C player fails to uncover bad intention, hence the
usual S value should be considered.
A previous work revealed that the mentioned
strategies are capable to form a cyclically domi-
nant loop if the detecting probability p is not too
small and the cost of hiding γ is not too large.
[35]. An interesting observation was that deceit-
ful behavior fares better if it is costly, which was
an excellence consequence of cyclically dominant
ranks of the mentioned strategies. In particular,
the increased γ value would be believed to weaken
strategy X , still the biggest looser is its “preda-
tor” strategy, which is D. Indeed, in this model
at reasonably high p value conditional cooperators
outperform pure defectors who dominate deceitful
defectors who should bear the extra cost. But the
latter pays when anX player meets with a C player.
In our present work we study how the men-
tioned cyclic loop influences the stationary frac-
tions of strategies when one of them is technically
“strengthened” by a smaller transition rate. Ac-
cording to the na¨ıve expectation a reduced learn-
ing activity helps these players to keep their strate-
gies longer hence a time average of their fractions
will grow. As we will demonstrate, however, this is
not the case and the observed behavior is strongly
related to the non-transitive ranks of competitor
strategies.
But before we proceed we clarify the technical de-
tails of simulations. Again, for proper comparison
we applied square grid interaction topology with
L × L = 3000 × 3000 system size, where typically
5 · 105 MCSs were applied for relaxation, but con-
ceptually similar behavior can be also observed in
other graphs. Notably, the unusual large system
size was necessary to reach the proper cyclically
dominant solution from a random initial condition
at every parameter values.
Our key observations are summarized in Fig. 4,
where we plotted how the frequency of the spe-
cific “predator” strategy changes in dependence of
hiding cost γ when the related “prey” strategy
uses a reduced learning activity. As for the pre-
vious model, on the top of this figure we have
displayed the proper ranks of strategies. Based
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Figure 4: Improvement of “predator” strategy as a function of cost of deceitful defectors. In this model pure defectors
(D), conditional cooperators (C), and deceitful defectors (X) compete. The latter has to bear an extra cost γ to hide its
proper strategy. The ranks of strategies are indicated on the top of the plot. Similarly to the previous model the “predator”
strategy enjoys the reduced learning activity of related “prey” strategy. The latter strategy is marked in every panel. The
enhanced “predator” abundance remains valid until the system remains in the three-strategy state, where cyclic dominance is
maintained. Parameters are T = 1.3, S = −0.3, and p = 0.8 where the latter is the probability that a conditional cooperator
correctly identifies pure defectors and avoid being exploited by them.
on this it becomes clear why a reduced learning
activity supports primarily the related “predator”
strategy even if this decreased invasion rate is ap-
plied for both directions of other external strategies.
This symmetry, however, which was highlighted by
dashed arrows in Fig. 1, becomes marginal in the
presence of cyclic loop. The latter is proved to be
so strong circumstance that we practically observe
similar system reaction to those were previously re-
ported for uni-directional invasions in the frame-
work of RSP game.
In particular, as it is shown in panel (a), when
deceitful defectors are supported by keeping their
state via reduced wl, then the fraction of pure defec-
tors will increase significantly. Similarly, panel (b)
illustrates that the unambiguous victor of reduced
learning activity of cooperators is deceitful defec-
tors. This effect becomes invalid only for high γ cost
values where the system leaves the cyclically dom-
inant three-strategy solution and only conditional
cooperators coexist with deceitful defectors. Last,
panel (c) shows the system reaction when defec-
tors adopts other strategies with reduced probabil-
ity. Here the increment of conditional cooperators
seem to be modest, but our goal was to present re-
sults obtained at identical p value for all panels. In-
deed, higher growth of fC can be observed at other
parameter values.
Our next plot, shown in Fig. 5, illustrates how the
frequency of “predator” strategy changes as we de-
crease the learning activity of “prey” strategy. This
behavior is in agreement with the one we previously
observed for the other model. More precisely, the
more we “support” a prey strategy to keep its state,
the better is for the related “predator” partner.
Hence lower wl is beneficial for involved “preda-
tors” except the small wl interval where the system
evolves to a non-cyclical solution. The message,
however, is clear: even if we apply more sophisti-
cated strategies in the original prisoner’s dilemma,
if a closed loop of ranks emerges then we can ob-
serve system reaction similar to the simplest RSP
game.
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Figure 5: Stationary fraction of “predator” strategies in
dependence of the learning activity of their related “prey”
strategies in the conditional cooperator – deceitful defector
model. Similarly to the previous model lower wl of “prey”
strategy provides a higher stationary fraction for its “preda-
tor” strategy until the three-strategy cyclically dominant so-
lution remains stable. The extra cost of deceitful defectors
is γ = 0.28 for fC , and for fD, while γ = 0.15 for fX . Other
parameters are T = 1.3, S = −0.3, and p = 0.8.
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2.3. Case study 3: Multi-cycles with informed
strategies
Our last example is related to a system where
more than three strategies are available, and not
only one, but two independent solutions possess
cyclic loop [36]. Here, beside unconditional cooper-
ators (C) and unconditional defectors (D) we have
the so-called informed strategies who make special
effort to explore others intention or hide their real
goal. In particular, informed cooperators (IC) are
capable to recognize correctly a partner’s intention
and cooperate with other cooperators while avoid
being exploited by all types of defectors. Conse-
quently, its appropriate defector version, called as
informed defector (ID), can only deceive uncondi-
tional cooperators. These two strategies make a
special effort for additional information, which fact
is considered via an extra cost. The corresponding
payoff matrix is
C D IC ID
C R S R S
D T P 0 P
IC R− ǫ −ǫ R− ǫ −ǫ
ID T − ǫ −ǫ −ǫ −ǫ
Here ǫ denotes the mentioned extra cost for addi-
tional information while the rest of parameters are
identical those of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma
game. One may claim some conceptual parallel
with the model discussed in previous case study,
but here we have a significantly richer system be-
havior. More precisely, two independent solutions
may emerge which are characterized by a closed
loop of strategy rank. For example, a solution
with the effective invasion IC → D → C → IC
and an alternative triplet with the directed loop of
IC → ID → C → IC can also be detected. Notably,
these triplets behave as a defensive alliance against
an external strategy. For example, if a player of
IC attacks a pure cooperator or defector player of
(IC + D + C) triplet then IC is capable to invade
the external aggressor.
Interestingly, the outcome of the battle of these
triplets depends on how intensive the invasion flow
within a certain triplet. For example, if the strategy
exchange within the (IC+D+C) loop is faster than
the average invasion rate within the (IC + ID +C)
loop than the former alliance prevails [36]. This
is a general phenomenon of models where strategy
alliances compete in a multi-state system [37, 38,
39, 40].
Next we explore the possible consequence of a
strategy-dependent learning activity where the re-
ferred strategy may be member of two compet-
ing loops. To allow the proper comparison with
previous results we follow earlier parametrization,
namely T = 1 + r, S = −r, R = 1, while P = −p.
In this way parameter r denotes the strength of the
dilemma and the measure of p allows different al-
liances to dominate the system. Furthermore the
applied additional cost of informed strategies was
fixed at ǫ = 0.3. During the simulations we have
used lattice size up to 4000 × 4000 to obtain the
reliable solution that is valid in the large-size limit.
The applied typical relaxation time was between
105 − 106 MCSs.
We first present results obtained in the light pun-
ishment (p = 0.3) region where normally (D+C +
IC) alliance dominate. The results, summarized in
Fig. 6, are in excellent agreement with the behav-
ior we have observed for simpler systems previously.
Namely, in every cases when the learning activity of
a specific strategy is modified then the fraction of
related “predator” strategy growths independently
of the strength of dilemma. In particular strategy C
benefits from reduced wl of IC , shown in panel (a).
In the next panel D enjoys the lowered learning ac-
tivity of strategy C, and finally IC gains from the
low wl values of D players. Evidently the mea-
sure of enhanced frequency of the specific “preda-
tor” strategy depends sensitively on the strength
of dilemma (r) and the actual pair of “predator-
prey” interaction. For example, we have to decrease
wl to low values to present visible improvement of
IC , while to increase fD was already feasible even
at much significantly higher wl values of strategy
D. It is because the effective invasion rate between
strategies depends not only the learning activity,
but also on the highly non-linear payoff difference
of competing partners.
To close our last case study we present results ob-
tained at harsh punishment value where the other
triplet dominates in the original model. Based
on our previous experience with simpler systems
and the low-punishment version of present model,
the results summarized in Fig. 7 are in comforting
agreement with our expectation. Namely, the ar-
gument that is built on “predator–prey” relation of
strategy pairs originated from cyclic dominance is
so strong ingredient of the model that overcomes
any other details of dynamical rule change. That is
even if the intervention onto the learning activity
ensures a symmetrical change toward both direc-
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Figure 6: Improvement of “predator” strategy as a function of dilemma strength in the model where pure cooperator and
defector strategies compete with informed cooperators. The ranks of strategies are indicated on the top of the plot, while the
applied wl values are denoted in the legend. All panels illustrate clearly that the impact of reduced learning activity on the
abundance of “predator” strategy is a general phenomenon. The value of punishment is P = −0.3, while the additional cost of
informed cooperators is ǫ = 0.3 for all cases.
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Figure 7: Improvement of “predator” strategy as a function of dilemma strength in the model where both pure and informed
strategies are present. Here the value of punishment is P = −0.7 which allows another cyclically dominant solution to emerge.
The involved strategies and their ranks are indicated on the top of the plot. As usual, the applied wl values for the specific
strategy are denoted in the legend. The additional cost of informed cooperators and informed defectors is ǫ = 0.3 for all cases.
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tions, but the system reaction recalls those behav-
ior that was previously observed for uni-directional
invasion rule. In this way, as shown in panel (a),
pure C benefits from modified IC learning activity,
while pure D enjoys reduced C learning. Last, as
illustrated in panel (c), the success of IC requires a
modified D’s learning rule.
3. Conclusions
We would like to stress that non-transitive
relations among competing strategies are more
widespread than one may na¨ıvely expected and they
are not restricted to the Lotka-Volterra-, or RSP -
type systems [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47], but can
be potentially found in broader range of evolution-
ary game models [48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54]. In
general, when we increase the number of available
strategies the mentioned relation among competi-
tors emerges almost inevitably [55, 56, 57]. This is
why it is crucial to clarify whether it is possible to
transfer our knowledge about cyclic-dominant sys-
tems to broader models where the strategy invasion
happens in both directions.
In our present work we have explored how the
cyclic dominance that emerges as an effective re-
lation between strategies influence the stationary
fractions when invasion rates are modified via the
microscopic adoption rule. Interestingly we have
done it in a symmetric manner because the original
adoption probabilities of other external strategies
are reduced uniformly. In this way not just the
“predator–prey” transition is weakened, but also
the learning rate from alternative strategies, too.
Despite the obvious difference from the dynam-
ical rule of Lotka-Volterra-type systems the inter-
vention into learning rates of strategies of a social
dilemma result in conceptually similar system reac-
tion we have already observed for the former sys-
tem. We have illustrated this behavior for different
models starting from the simplest, where cooper-
ators and defectors compete with loner, to more
complex systems where more than three strategies
are available and they are more sophisticated than
unconditional strategies.
Our observations are clear and show toward the
same direction. Namely, the presence of cyclic dom-
inance among competitors is a very strong condition
that dominates the system behavior no matter in-
vasions may happen to both directions in the loop.
Consequently, when we want to reinforce a strategy
by making harder to change its state then we sup-
port its “predator” strategy unintentionally. The
more we suppress a specific learning activity of an
agent or species the better will benefit from it by
an alternative partner. This fact should be con-
sidered in every ecological or human systems when
our goal is to modify the portions of system mem-
bers by an intervention into the microscopic process
[58, 59, 60, 61].
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